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Recent Decisions
CIVIL PROCEDURE-LONG-ARM STATUTE'-BROAD INTERPRETATION-
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court interpreted the scope of Section 331,
which provides for service against non-resident owners of real estate,
and concluded the word "involved" as used in the statute does not
require a causal connection between the accident or injury and the
real estate, but only the occurrence of the accident or injury on the
real estate.
Betcher v. Hay-Roe, 429 Pa. 371, 240 A.2d 501 (1968).
Appellant's preliminary objections to jurisdiction over him as a non-
resident defendant 2 were overruled in the Court of Common Pleas of
Allegheny County. Appeal was made directly to the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania. 3
The appellee allegedly sustained personal injuries as a result of an
accident which occurred on May 18, 1966, at the residence of the
appellants who occupied a house in Mt. Lebanon, Allegheny County,
Pennsylvania. On that date appellee, while baby-sitting for appellant's
children, was allegedly injured when a chair upon which she was sitting
collapsed.
On June 25, 1966, appellants moved from Allegheny County and
1. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 331 (1953).
[A]ny nonresident of this Commonwealth being the owner, tenant, or user, of real
estate located within the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and the footways and curbs
adjacent thereto, or any such resident of this Commonwealth who shall subsequently
become a nonresident, shall, by the ownership, possession, occupancy, control, main-
tenance, and use, of such real estate, footways, and curbs, make and constitute the
Secretary of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania his, her, its, or their agent for the
service of process in any civil action or proceedings instituted in the courts of the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania against such owner, tenant, or user, of such real
estate, footways, and curbs, arising out of or by reason of any accident or injury occur-
ring within the Commonwealth in which such real estate, footways, and curbs are
involved.
2. The objections were based upon Pennsylvania's long-arm statute; PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 12, § 331 (1953).
3. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 672 (1953).
Wherever in any proceeding at law or in equity the question of jurisdiction over the
defendant or of the cause of action for which suit is brought is raised in the court
of first instance, it shall be preliminarily determined by the court upon the pleadings
or with the depositions, as the case may require; and the decision may be appealed
to the Supreme Court, or the Superior Court, as in the cases of final judgments.
See, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 Rule 1017(b)(1) (1967), which suspends operation of this act
except insofar as it confers the right to appeal from a decision on a jurisdictional question.
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became residents of Hawaii. Appellee instituted suit in the Court of
Common Pleas, Allegheny County, and pursuant to the Pennsylvania
long-arm statute4 the complaint was served on the Secretary of the
Commonwealth and upon the appellants by registered mail.
Appellant's objection was that substituted service was improper under
these facts since Section 331 provides for this type service when there
is an "accident or injury occurring within the Commonwealth in which
such real estate, footways, and curbs are involved."5 Appellant con-
tended that real estate was in no way involved since the chair which
allegedly collapsed was personalty. The Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania, however, agreed with the lower court that "the situation pre-
sented was one which fell within the scope of the Act of July 2, 1937,
-.. and that substituted service of process had been properly accom-
plished.''6 In so doing the court reversed interpretations of lower courts
which had concerned themselves with finding a causal connection be-
tween the real estate and the injury.7 The Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania stated that, "[w]e cannot agree with these courts that 'involvement'
under the Statute requires more than the occurrence of the accident or
injury on the real estate." 8
Appellant's argument of causal connection between real estate and
injury rested solely on lower court opinions due to the lack of appellate
court decisions on Section 331. Reference is first made to the case of
Andrews v. Joffa,9 in which a minor defendant inflicted a gun wound
on another minor while on a farm owned by the defendant's father,
who was made a party defendant in the case. The defendants, however,
were residents of Ohio which brought Section 331 into issue. The
Andrews' court was of the opinion that the occurrence of the injury on
the farm did not mean the farm was "involved in the injury."' 0 The
Andrews' opinion pointed out that it had no appellate court cases to
give it guidance in defining the scope of "involved" as used in Section
331. Thus the court in Andrews relied on other lower court decisions,
one of which was Shouse v. Wagner." That court in its attempt to define
4. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 331 (1953).
5. Id.
6. Betcher v. Hay Roe, 429 Pa. 371, 373, 240 A.2d 501, 503 (1968).
7. Andrews v. Joffa, 3 Crawford Co. L.J. 192 (1963): Shouse v. Wagner, 84 Pa. D. & C.
82 (1952).
8. 429 Pa. at 375, 240 A.2d at 503.
9. 3 Crawford Co. L.J. 192 (1963).
10. Id. at 197.
11. 84 Pa. D. & C. 82 (1952).
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"involved" stated that "[b]eing 'involved', is not the same as being the
site or location of an accident or injury. ' ' 1 2
Moreover, the problem of statutory interpretation in regard to Sec-
tion 331 is sharpened in focus when that section is compared with
Section 106.1" The latter section is a venue statute used to determine
the county in which a cause of action will be brought, while Section 331
is a jurisdictional statute dealing with those not residing in the state.
Section 106 which contains broader language than Section 331 was
formerly construed in a very restrictive manner by the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania in the case of Olson v. Kucencic.'4 In order that Sec-
tion 106 be operative it was deemed necessary that a cause of action
arise from a condition inherent in, or incident to the realty before the
statutory language of "occurring upon real estate" could be satisfied.' 5
This contention of causal connection between the cause of action and
realty is made by appellant in regard to Section 331.
In support of this restrictive interpretation of Section 106, Olson
quoted the common law rule in regard to service of process. The rule is
that: " 'In an action in personam the process must be served personally
within the jurisdiction of the court in which the action was commenced,
upon the person to be affected thereby.' "16 The Olson court noted that
since Section 106 has no language which inherently limits its scope, to
interpret "occurring upon real estate" as all that is necessary for appli-
cation of the act would "so broaden the intent of the Act as to authorize
extra-territorial service of process in almost any conceivable action
regardless of its nature.' a17 The problem of unlimited scope of applica-
tion does not exist with Section 331. Where Section 106 simply names
the "defendant" as the proper person upon whom to serve process,' 8
12. Id. at 84.
13. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 106 (1953).
In cases where claims are made for damages arising from any accident or injury
occurring upon real estate, the footways, sidewalks, and curbs adjacent thereto, it
shall be lawful to commence an action for the recovery of damages in any court of
record in the county wherein the real estate, footways, sidewalks, and curbs, are
located, and service of process may be made by the sheriff of the county in which the
action is brought, by deputizing tlhe sheriff of the county wherein the defendant
resides or where service may be had upon such defendant under the existing laws of
this Commonwealth, in like manner as process may be now served in the proper
county. (Emphasis added).
14. 389 Pa. 506, 133 A.2d 596 (1957).
15. Id. at 508, 133 A.2d at 598.
16. Id. at 509, 133 A.2d at 597.
17. Id.
18. See, Rich v. Meadville Park Theatre Corp., 360 Pa. 338, 62 A.2d 1 (1948), which
stated that defendant is not limited to owner, lessee, or user of real estate.
140
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Section 331 enumerates "owner, tenant and user" as the only ones upon
whom service can be made. Thus where the Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania felt compelled to limit Section 106, it saw no reason to do so with
Section 331 since it has an inherent limitation within its wording. The
type of Imitation placed on Section 106 is understandable within the
context of that statute. That is, Section 106 is a venue statute determin-
ing which county court will hear the cause of action, but not whether
the state court has jurisdiction. It is meant to deal only with residing
parties, while Section 331 deals with non-residing parties in which the
question of entertaining the cause of action in the state is the primary
concern. With this in mind the court may have felt the best forum
for presenting the evidence would be attained under Section 106 by
limiting the statute. Whether it was legitimate for the court to broaden
Section 331 will be discussed below.
The implementation of the two statutes may be compared thusly: if
one is attempting to utilize the machinery of Section 106 in order to
get extra county service of process on the resident "defendant" one
must first establish a causal connection between the real estate and the
cause of action in order to satisfy the statutory language of "occurring
upon real estate"; if one is attempting to utilize the machinery of Sec-
tion 331 in order to get service of process on a non-resident "owner,
tenant, or user of real estate" there need only be the occurrence of the
injury on the real estate in order to satisfy the statutory language of
"involved" real estate.
Thus what Betcher stands for is a broadening in the scope of applic-
ability of Section 331 which had seemed, by its own language and previ-
ous lower court decisions, to have only a limited application.
It would be difficult to accurately analyze and evaluate Betcher
without going into the history of personal long-arm jurisdiction, and
the place that Section 331 holds in that history. For this survey the
landmark decision of International Shoe v. State of Washington 9 will
be used as a pivotal point around which the discussion can move in an
attempt to put Section 331 in proper perspective.
International Shoe laid down the broad standards of due process
under which courts and legislatures presently operate.
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to
a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory
19. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that
the maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of
fair play and substantive justice."20
Prior to International Shoe, the scope of due process was rather re-
stricted. There were, of course, the traditional bases for jurisdiction;
if a person was physically present, or consented to jurisdiction, or
domiciled in the forum state he could be subject to its jurisdiction. At
one time these were satisfactory methods of process. The lack of geo-
graphic mobility increased the causes of action arising in the forum
state within which the parties resided, while the reduction in the signifi-
cance of state borders necessitated an increase in the bases of state
jurisdiction. States began to recognize the need to increase their juris-
diction, but prior to International Shoe lacked broad operative guide-
lines. This lack of leeway in the due process area brought on such
fictional doctrines as "implied consent,"2 ' and "doing business" as a
basis for "physical presence. '2 2 In 1937 Pennsylvania became the first
state to make real estate a basis for attaining jurisdiction over a non-
resident defendant. Section 331 came in a period when legislatures were
looking for ways to extend non-resident jurisdiction, but were not
certain just how broad an extension would be justified. The restrictive
nature of the statute can be explained by the fact that until Interna-
tional Shoe there was no substantial authority for enacting such a real
property statute.23 What the statute amounted to was a limited provi-
sion which could only be invoked upon commission of certain torts
within the state. This re-emphasized the pivotal nature of International
Shoe, since after that decision there was no longer any need for fictions
or limited legislative enactments which feared they would outdistance
the bounds of due process.
Subsequent to International Shoe, the facts indicate that many states
did not take advantage of the full potentialities of that decision.2 4 This
20. Id. at 316.
21. In Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Spratley, 172 U.S. 602 (1899), the Court reasoned that a
consent to be sued in the state might be presumed by the state as a condition to permitting
the non-resident corporation to do business within the state.
22. In Philadelphia & Reading R.R. v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264 (1917), jurisdiction was
granted on the theory that non-resident corporation by "doing business" within the state
became "present" there.
23. In Dubin v. City of Philadelphia, 34 Pa. D. & C. 61 (1938), it was held that the
statute was constitutional, but without any authority to support that position.
24. See, Developments in the Law-State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARV. L. REv. 909
(1960); Currie, The Growth of Long Arm: Eight Years of Extended Jurisdiction in
Illinois, U. ILL. L.F. 53 (1963); von Mehren and Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate:
A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1121 (1966).
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seems to be in large part the problem the Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania faced in the Betcher case. The fact that the statute is limited as
regards causes of action has already been noted, but beyond the limited
number of actions which can be brought based on the statute is the
problem of limited language.
From our present perspective there seems little reason for the limited
statute. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania interpreted the statute
in a much broader fashion than it was written, and it seems clear that
the broad interpretation does not violate due process. Betcher pointed
out that simply reviewing the facts shows that there is no violation of
due process. The court in Betcher made reference to the case of Gear-
hart v. Pulakos25 to support this rationale. Although the fact situations
in the two cases are distinguishable, in that Gearhart does involve a
causal connection between real estate and injury, the discussion of the
scope of due process in Gearhart is still valuable. The court in Gearhart
drew an analogy between the use of highways and the use of real prop-
erty. It was pointed out that it is the use of highways that authorizes
service on non-resident defendants, and this leads to the conclusion in
regard to real property that "the ownership of property in Pennsylvania
at the time an accident occurs upon it, which is the basis of a cause of
action, permits service of process in the Federal Courts by the United
States Marshal .... 26
In line with the above reasoning one can examine further what could
be called the "due process gap." In determining whether or not such a
gap exists one must first find a fact situation which would not violate
due process when analyzed on its own merits, and devoid of any relevant
state statute. If one can at this point conclude there is no violation of
due process, then the second element of the examination, the relevant
state statute, must be made applicable to the fact situation. If such
application is impossible, or at best can only be accomplished by a type
of statutory expansion, then to some degree a gap exists between present
due process standards and the relevant state statute. The examination
of the facts in Betcher by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania showed
no violation of due process. However, the application of Section 331 to
the facts was a difficult task because of the statute's limitations. More-
over, suppose the facts had been somewhat different in that the chair
was not on appellant's property at the time of the injury, but instead
25. 207 F. Supp. 369 (W.D. Pa. 1962).
26. 207 F. Supp. at 373.
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had been taken to a nearby playground at which place it collapsed
causing the injury. No one under those circumstances would attempt
to apply Section 331, yet the same justifiable facts would exist which
make Pennsylvania the only logical and just forum in which to bring
the suit. The hypothetical facts are meant only to reemphasize the
limitations of Section 331 as a statute by which personal long-arm
jurisdiction can be attained. A court is unlikely to have any success in
attempting to cure what is evidently an outmoded statute.
Although Betcher broadens Section 331, and makes it more in accord
with present due process standards it also presents a substantial ques-
tion: Should the legislature move to void the gap between a limited
long-arm provision and the present broadened range of due process?
John Tumolo
CRIMINAL LAW-SEARCHES AND SEIZURES-The Supreme Court of the
United States held that a policeman is justified in making a search
for weapons in the outer clothing of one who he reasonably suspects
is armed and dangerous, even though the policeman has no probable
cause to arrest the man he is detaining.
Terry v. State of Ohio, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968).
Petitioner and two other men were observed by a policeman who sus-
pected them of "casing a job, a stick-up" because of their activity in
front of a store window. The men had been walking up and down the
street in front of the store, looking in the window and conferring.
Fearing that the men were armed, the police officer confronted peti-
tioner, asked his name and, having received a mumbled answer,
patted down the outside of his clothing. The officer felt a pistol in
the pocket of petitioner's overcoat, moved him inside the store and
removed his overcoat taking the pistol out. The trial court held' and
the Supreme Court affirmed 2 that the gun was admissible as evidence
against petitioner, and, thus, that the search was not unreasonable on
the basis that the police officer had the right to search those whom he
1. See State v. Terry, 5 Ohio App. 2d 122, 214 N.E.2d 114 (1966).
2. Terry v. State of Ohio, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968). Mr. Chief Justice Warren delivered the
opinion of the Court. Mr. Justice Douglas dissented.
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